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Why Nicaraguan Peasants Remain in Agricultural Production Cooperatives1  
Zvi Lerman and Ruerd Ruben  
Abstract 
A substantial number of Nicaraguan peasants remain in agricultural production cooperatives 
created as part of the Sandinista land reform in the 1980s. This phenomenon persists despite the 
current regime’s support for parcellation of the land-reform cooperatives and contrary to 
theoretical considerations that regard individual farms as more productive and more efficient. 
We aim to identify the factors that govern the choice of Nicaraguan peasants between staying in 
a cooperative and exiting to start an individual farm. Sample data from 475 landed households in 
four agro-ecological macro-regions are used to compare resources, incomes, and productivity of 
peasants remaining in production cooperatives, former members of cooperatives who became 
independent farmers, and peasants who had always farmed independently. Low capital 
endowments of the new independent farmers adversely affect their standard of living. Better 
access to non-farm income encourages peasants to remain in the cooperative, where they are less 
exposed to risk. Uncertainty associated with land ownership rights and difficulties with 
resolution of cooperative debt play a dominant role in keeping Nicaraguan peasants in 
cooperatives. Cooperative members maintain a high degree of coordination of activities and are 
thus able to capture the benefits of rural development programs.  
Keywords: cooperative farms, individual farming, land reform, Latin America, social capital. 
Introduction: Persistence of Cooperatives 
The cooperative experience in Nicaragua followed the web and flow of domestic politics. During 
the four decades of the Somoza regime (1936-1979), the structure of agricultural holdings in 
Nicaragua had an extremely polarized distribution consisting of a small number of extensive 
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private estates and a large number of very small family plots. The political and social failures of 
the Somoza regime led to the Sandinista revolution in 1979, and the new ruling party 
implemented its socialist agenda by expropriating the land of the large estate owners and 
allocating it to the use of the rural landless. However, the peasants were encouraged to join 
agricultural production cooperatives (APCs) rather than use the allocated plots for individual 
farming. The Sandinista policies thus led to the creation of large agricultural cooperatives in 
place of former privately owned estates and did relatively little to enlarge and strengthen the 
sector of family farms (Baumeister 1998; Everingham 2001). In the best socialist tradition, 
cooperatives enjoyed generous support under the Sandinista government.  
 After about a decade, the socialist-oriented Sandinista regime was replaced in democratic 
elections by a market-oriented government. The new government policies emphasized 
liberalization of the entire economy and abandoned the former preferential treatment of 
agricultural cooperatives. The change in government policies and attitudes led to a wave of 
liquidations of agricultural cooperatives, and many peasants left their cooperatives with a plot of 
land for individual farming. Yet not all the agricultural production cooperatives were liquidated 
despite the changes in the political atmosphere, and some continue to exist to the present day. 
 The persistence of agricultural production cooperatives in Nicaragua raises an interesting 
research question. Theoretical considerations and empirical evidence suggest that individual 
farms are more productive and more efficient than agricultural production cooperatives (see, e.g., 
Hazell 2003). Why is it then that the Nicaraguan cooperatives did not fully split up into 
individual farms once the government had abolished the policy constraints favoring 
cooperatives? Is it possible to identify the factors that govern the choice of Nicaraguan farmers 
between remaining in a cooperative and exiting to start an individual farm?  
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 A similar change in the policy environment took place in the transition economies in the 
former Soviet Union and Central Eastern Europe, where government policies dramatically 
shifted from unquestioning support of collective farming as a mandatory organizational form in 
agriculture to a more liberal market-oriented attitude that allowed individual farming (Brooks 
1993). The initial expectations were of a rapid breakup of large-scale collective farms2 and a 
sweeping transition to individual farming on land withdrawn from the former collectives. Yet 
these expectations have not materialized so far and large-scale collective structures continue to 
exist in all former socialist countries (although now they are organized as large-scale 
corporations that cultivate land not withdrawn for individual farming). The persistence of 
collective (or corporate) farming in transition countries – contrary to the standard pattern of 
agriculture in market economies – is an intriguing topic that attracts considerable attention 
among scholars (Amelina 2000; Deininger 1995). Unfortunately, no satisfactory analytical 
results are available to explain this phenomenon in transition countries beyond the usual 
argument that peasants try to avoid new risks by staying under the familiar collective umbrella. 
Nicaraguan data could shed some light on the reasons for the persistence of cooperative farms in 
environments where policies purportedly encourage individual farming.  
 This study is based on a representative survey of 475 landed households in four agro-
ecological regions located in the central part of Nicaragua, where agriculture is an important 
component of rural livelihoods.3  These macro-regions cover various agro-ecological conditions 
and farming systems that are typical for the Nicaraguan countryside. The sample was designed to 
include three distinct groups of respondents: (1) peasants who continued to farm in agricultural 
production cooperatives, (2) former members of agricultural production cooperatives who 
decided to take up independent farming, and (3) peasants who had always been engaged in 
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independent farming.4 The survey was carried out in 2000 and focused on the analysis of 
underlying differences in farm household characteristics, level and composition of household 
income, assets and wealth, and efficiency of production systems as possible reasons for staying 
in or exiting from the cooperative framework.5 
 The remainder of the article is structured as follows. We provide a short overview of land 
policies that led to the formation of agricultural production cooperatives in Nicaragua during the 
1980s and subsequent programs for individual land titling during the 1990s. Main factors that 
influence the socio-economic position of cooperative members vis-à-vis old and new 
independent peasants are highlighted. Then follows an empirical analysis of the income position 
and living standards of each of the three groups of peasant households. We address possible 
differences in production efficiency among the three groups, concluding that these are hardly 
sufficient to explain any inherent superiority of either individual or cooperative farming. We 
accordingly proceed to analyze the role of other internal and external factors that influence the 
decision to stay in the cooperative or to become an independent peasant. Attention is focused on 
differences in human, physical, and social capital that determine individual preferences regarding 
the desired institutional arrangements. We conclude with some policy suggestions for removing 
the constraints that still prevent Nicaraguan peasants from making a free choice between 
alternative organizational forms of independent farming and cooperative membership. These 
suggestions are guided by the general view that minimizing the constraints on the activities of 
economic agents is conducive to economic efficiency. 
Rural Organization in Nicaragua 
Nicaragua provides a challenging environment for the analysis of changing patterns of rural 
organization. During the last decades, the roles and functions performed by state, market, and 
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community organizations have been frequently modified. The former Sandinista government 
(1979-1989) placed great emphasis on the role of state agencies for trade, credit, and extension 
services. The land reform program favored – after an initial preference for state farms – the 
establishment of a large number of production cooperatives in the agrarian sector.6 The rural 
cooperative sector in Nicaragua represented in 1989 about 21% of agricultural land use, 20% of the 
rural population, and 24% of agrarian production (San Martin 1992).7  Subsequent liberal regimes 
strongly reduced credit support and service delivery to cooperatives and permitted the 
parcellation of cooperative land, leading to a distinct decline in cooperative membership. At the 
end of 1999 the rural cooperative sector was reduced to no more than 9% of the land and 8% of 
the rural population (Ruben and Masset 2003). The partial disintegration of the land-reform 
cooperatives gave rise to a number of diverse pathways of organizational change. Some peasants 
left the cooperative and took up individual farming, while others decided to remain cooperative 
members.  
The process of land reform during the Sandinista regime emphasized the creation of 
agricultural production cooperatives as an alternative for poor and often landless households to 
get access to land, credit, and extension services. Collective ownership was initially promoted as a 
device to maintain rural stability and to allow effective delivery of public services. Peasant 
organizations also readily embraced the cooperative mode due to the perceived advantages of 
economies of scale and as a means to reinforce their negotiating position vis-à-vis the government. 
However, internal organization of newly established APCs was largely based on close interaction 
between peasant households that maintain strong family ties (Carter el al. 1993). Collective fields 
were usually reserved for cash crop production while members maintained individually operated 
subsidiary plots to satisfy their home consumption needs. Labor services supplied to operations in 
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collective fields were paid for on a weekly or monthly basis and represented an advance payment 
against the harvest. Most Nicaraguan APCs therefore relied on bank credit to purchase farm inputs 
and to pay for members’ labor.   
Peasants’ willingness to engage in cooperative production has traditionally been attributed 
to motives of income generation and risk sharing. Several internal and external problems make 
farmers averse to full participation in collective resource management. Free-riding behavior and 
non-compliance are frequently mentioned in the literature as motives for leaving the cooperative. 
In addition, policies towards market liberalization, financial reforms, and new legislation 
regarding ownership encourage the parcellation of land-reform cooperatives. Yet legal 
uncertainties regarding land ownership, unclear entitlements of individual members to 
collectively owned assets, and difficulties with the resolution of outstanding debts inhibit in 
practice any straightforward subdivision. Therefore, a wide range of institutional arrangements 
have emerged, including peasants who stick to APC membership and others who prefer 
independent production or seek loose affiliation that still guarantees access to some services.  
The disadvantages of large-scale, capital-intensive cooperative farms are generally 
acknowledged. Well-known problems of under-investment, labor shirking, productivity decline, 
and membership desertion affect cooperative performance.8 If access to bank credit is substantially 
reduced, cooperatives are likely to disintegrate as they are inherently unable to raise equity or 
private loans and are thus left without financial sources for paying to members engaged in 
collective activities. The promulgation of a new legal framework that encourages the issuing of 
individual titles or landownership certificates further reinforces this tendency towards 
parcellation. 
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Modern approaches to rural organization focus on aspects of risk sharing, access to 
information, and reduction of transaction costs as potential reasons for maintaining cooperative 
relations (Hoff et al. 1993; Bardhan 1989). Common-property resource management is also seen as 
a device to control natural resource depletion (Bromley 1992; Wilson and Thompson 1993). It has 
been demonstrated that resource-use efficiency on collective parcels is not necessarily inferior to 
that on private parcels (Ruben 1999). The importance of cooperative ties for securing peasants’ 
livelihoods in rural Nicaragua is widely acknowledged (Jonakin 1992; Carter et al. 1993).  
Medium-size agricultural cooperatives that rely on linkages between semi-independent family 
plots could therefore still be attractive to peasant households (Carter 1987; Putterman 1981; 
Hussi et al. 1993). 
Earlier research on agrarian cooperatives is related to large-scale (mechanized) farms 
under socialist-oriented political regimes. In Nicaragua, most APCs are medium-size enterprises 
with labor-intensive production systems. These cooperatives were originally established during 
the land-reform process, and it is interesting to analyze their behavior when market-oriented 
policies are put in place. Contrary to expectations triggered by the theoretical disadvantages of 
cooperative organization, APC members proved fairly reluctant to proceed towards full 
parcellation of land to individuals. The decision to continue APC membership or switch to 
independent farming can be viewed as an endogenous process where various internal and 
external factors interact. Indeed, Nicaraguan peasants have to face institutional choice at two 
distinct levels: (1) the decision whether to stay in the cooperative or switch to independent farming, 
and (2) the decision whether to rely on the cooperative as a channel for getting access to credit, 
services, and information or to rely on individual interaction with external agents. The first aspect 
refers to the existing opportunities for improving the members’ socio-economic position through 
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reallocation of available human and physical capital, while the second aspect relates to the 
possibilities for reliance on social capital as a device to guarantee access to inputs and output 
markets and thus improve household welfare. Even if independent farming enables peasants to 
improve resource management, limited access to markets and institutions may easily reduce this 
potential advantage to nil.  
Endowments, Incomes, and Productivity 
We analyzed the socio-economic situation of peasants who had always been independent 
producers (group I, labeled as “private”), peasants who had recently left the cooperative to take 
up independent farming (group II, labeled as “parcellation”), and households that continued 
cooperative membership (group III, labeled as “cooperation”). Subdivision of cooperative farms 
is only expected to be attractive when household income or farm productivity can be increased. 
Theoretical considerations suggest a prior ranking where established private farmers perform 
better than newly “parceled” farms, whereas the latter outperform cooperative farms (i.e. group I 
> group II > group III). We used standard ANOVA tools to identify significant differences 
among the three groups of producers in terms of resource endowments, income profiles, and 
living standards. In addition, estimated production functions were used to analyze differences in 
factor productivity. 
 The household profiles presented in Table 1 do not show a consistent pattern of 
differences across the three groups of peasants. To the extent that pairwise comparisons detect 
any differences between groups, group I (private farmers who have always remained 
independent) deviates most from the other two groups. No significant differences by any of the 
variables are observed between group II (“parcellation” farmers who have left the cooperative to 
take up independent farming) and group III (farmers who remain cooperative member). An 
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important conclusion from Table 1 is that group I farmers have more land, more livestock, and 
more equipment than group II farmers (only the differences in land and livestock are statistically 
significant). The new independent farmers who have left their cooperative are less endowed with 
basic physical capital compared to established private farmers. These differences in physical 
capital are reflected in higher levels of total family income and especially farm income for group 
I farmers compared with the other two groups. Moreover, the mean farm income for the new 
independent farmers in group II seems to be higher than for group III farmers remaining in 
cooperatives. The farm income results are thus consistent with the hypothesis formulated above. 
Unfortunately, these income differences are not statistically significant (due to the high 
variability in the sample data) and thus cannot be taken as real support for our hypothesis.  
Table 1.  Profiles of farm households in the survey (averages per household) 
 Whole 
sample 
(N=476) 
Group I: 
“Private” 
(N=155) 
Group II: 
“Parcellation” 
(N=154) 
Group III: 
“Cooperation” 
(N=167) 
Pairwise 
differences* 
Human capital 
Family size (persons) 6.7 6.3 7.1 7.0 I < II 
Children (younger than 8) 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.7 None 
Adults (older than 8) 5.2 4.9 5.4 5.2 None 
Average household age 33 36 32 31 I > II; I > III 
Average years of schooling  4.3 4.2 4.4 4.5 None 
Physical capital 
Land (manzanas)1 21.3 24.7 18.98 20.0 I > II 
Livestock (number of animals) 9.3 12.6 6.5 8.2 I > II; I > III 
Farm equipment (pieces) 5.9 6.2 5.8 5.8 None 
Income 
Family income (cordobas)2 24,148 29,078 21,880 21,664 None 
Farm income (cordobas)2 16,513 20,635 16,058 13,106 None 
Non-farm income(cordobas)2,3 7,636 8,443 5,882 8,558 None 
Share of non-farm income3,4 50% 44% 48% 57% None 
* Differences shown are statistically significant at 10% by the Bonferroni multiple pairwise comparisons test. 
1. Manzana is a unit of land area: 1 manzana = 0.7 hectares. 
2. Income in cordobas (US$1 = 7 cordobas at the time of the survey). 
3. Non-farm income includes wages received from the cooperative. 
4. Simple average of non-farm income shares for each respondent. 
 
 While the survey does not reveal statistically significant differences in income across the 
three groups, the data nevertheless clearly show that the total family income – and especially the 
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farm component of family income – increases with the increase of the amount of land available 
to the family. This phenomenon is demonstrated in Figure 1. Total family income rises from 
11,400 cordobas (US$1,630) for families with the smallest land plots (up to 2 manzanas, or 1.4 
hectares) to more than 40,000 cordobas (US$5,700) for families with 60 manzanas (42 hectares) 
and up. The non-farm income remains fairly stable in absolute value across all farm-size groups, 
and as a result its share in household income drops from about 85% for families with the smallest 
plots to about 15% for families with relatively large land endowments. Consistently with the 
situation in many developing countries, land endowment is a major factor in improving family 
income and well-being. 
 
 The descriptive univariate analysis presented above has been extended to a multivariate 
production-function framework to detect differences in factor productivity across the three 
groups. Theory suggests that independent farms (groups I and II) are more productive than farms 
operating in a production cooperative (group III). To test this hypothesis, we estimated a 
 Figure 1: Land Endowments and Family Income 
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standard Cobb-Douglas production function regressing farm income (in cordobas) as the 
dependent variable on land, the number of animals, the number of farm workers, and the number 
of pieces of farm machinery as the explanatory variables. The model also included a dummy 
variable corresponding to different groups of respondents (groups I, II, and III representing 
established independent farmers, peasants who have left the cooperative through parcellation, 
and peasants who continue to work in a cooperative).  
Table 2. Estimation of Cobb-Douglas production function with group dummy variables 
Dependent  variable : Farm income   
Explanatory variables Parameter estimate Significance level 
Intercept (Group III) 6.621 0.000 
Land 0.310 0.001 
Animals 0.236 0.002 
Labor -0.165 0.124 
Machinery 0.603 0.004 
Group I  (“private”) -0.062 0.754 
 II (“parcellation”) 0.204 0.305 
 III (“cooperation”) 0.000 -- 
R2 = 0.16 ; F-value = 11.07 (p = 0.000)   
 
 The estimation results are presented in Table 2. All factors (except labor) have significant 
positive coefficients, with farm machinery displaying the highest elasticity (0.6). The coefficient 
for labor is not statistically significant and has a negative sign, which may be indicative of excess 
labor on Nicaraguan farms. Such “overloading” is a frequently observed phenomenon in rural 
areas where land quality is poor and off-farm employment options are limited (Kennedy 1983). 
The main conclusion of the analysis, however, is that there are no clear-cut differences in 
productivity among the three groups: the intercept shifters (for groups I and II relative to group 
III) are not statistically significant in the sample. 
 The results of these analyses do not fully verify the general theoretical hypothesis that 
group I > group II > group III by relevant performance measures.9 To gain additional evidence 
for this hypothesis, we have examined some qualitative questions included in the subjective 
attitude part of the questionnaire. These questions provide information about the perceived 
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standard of living of the respondent families. One particular question asks whether the family has 
enough availability of food. Other questions attempt to get a more detailed assessment of the 
standard of living by exploring what the family can buy with the available income. The 
responses to both questions indicate that established private farmers experience a higher standard 
of living: nearly 60% of group I respondents report that they have enough food – compared to 
less than 50% in the other two groups; for over 20% of group I respondents the family income is 
sufficient to buy more than just food and basic daily necessities – compared to 12% in the other 
two groups. 
Table 3.  Perceived adequacy of family income as a measure of standard of living (percent of respondents by 
group) 
 Group I: 
“Private” 
Group II: 
“Parcellation” 
Group II: 
“Cooperation” 
Food security: Does the family have enough food? 
Yes 58 42 48 
Standard of living: What does the family income buy? 
Lowest: Not enough even for food  37 42 39 
Medium: Just enough for food and basic necessities 43 46 49 
Highest: Enough to buy more than just food and basic necessities 21 12 12 
Total 100 100 100 
 
 The differences in these percentages between group I (established private farmers) and 
groups II and III combined (former and present cooperative members) are statistically 
significant. The differences between groups II and III are not statistically significant. 
Nevertheless, the answers seem to indicate that group II respondents – the new independent 
farmers who have left their cooperative – have the lowest standard of living in the sample, even 
lower than the respondents who continue to belong to a cooperative. These qualitative results 
thus suggest that the standard of living ranking is group I > group III ≥ group II rather than group 
I > group II > group III. A possible explanation for this unexpected pattern probably can be 
found in the low capital endowments of group II farmers. Former cooperative members 
somehow do not get a fair deal when they leave the cooperative, receiving little land and 
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relatively few animals (see Table 1). These low capital endowments adversely affect their 
standard of living as new independent farmers. 
Reasons to Stay: The Role of Human and Physical Capital 
The better standard of living and the higher family incomes among independent farmers usually 
may provide an incentive for switching from cooperative to individual farming. Previous 
research suggests that the decision to leave an agricultural production cooperative and switch to 
independent farming is determined by the availability of both human and physical capital in the 
household (Deininger 1993; Putterman 1985). Human capital includes variables that describe the 
household’s labor pool (e.g., the number of adults in the household, age composition, and 
educational attainment). Physical capital includes land, livestock, farm machinery and buildings, 
and also family income, which is a source of funds for both working capital and investment, as 
well as a safety net for the family under adverse conditions. We would expect that a greater 
capital stock (both human and physical) should have a positive impact on the decision to leave 
the cooperative and start farming independently. People with more capital can afford to sacrifice 
the relative security of a cooperative and opt for the higher risks of independent farming, with its 
promise of commensurately higher returns. 
 We performed a logistic regression analysis to identify the impact of human and physical 
capital variables on the decision to leave the cooperative for independent farming.10 This impact 
is expressed by the effect on the probability of switching from cooperative to independent 
farming. If the impact is positive, an increase of the corresponding variable increases the 
probability of switching from cooperative to independent farming and we accordingly expect to 
get a positive coefficient in the estimated logistic model. If the impact is negative, an increase of 
the corresponding variable decreases the probability of switching from cooperative to 
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independent farming and we accordingly expect to get a negative coefficient in the estimated 
logistic model. 
 The logistic model in our analysis includes terms for age squared and years of schooling 
squared to capture nonlinear human capital effects, which are often discussed in the literature 
(Lerman et al., 2004). Regarding the effect of age, it is expected that as a person grows older, it 
becomes more difficult to change established patterns of behavior and older people are therefore 
less likely to leave the cooperative. However, the age variable spans the whole lifetime and its 
effect may change over the person’s life. Very young persons, without proper training and 
experience, are not ready to leave the cooperative. As young people become more mature and 
experienced, they may be willing to start a new way of life and are thus expected to exhibit a 
higher likelihood of leaving the cooperative than very young people. Beyond a certain age 
conservatism may predominate and the person will be more likely to stay in the cooperative. 
These two opposing effects are captured by a combination of linear and quadratic terms in the 
model: the willingness of young people to leave the cooperative is demonstrated by the linear 
term (with an expected positive sign), while the reluctance of older people to leave is reflected in 
the quadratic term (with an expected negative sign). The quadratic term becomes dominant as 
age increases, and on the whole age will have a negative impact on the probability of leaving the 
cooperative. Similar considerations suggest that increases in education at a very basic level (few 
years of schooling) will not necessarily increase the likelihood of leaving the cooperative, yet as 
the educational endowment increases beyond a certain basic level, people will become ready to 
start a new life as independent farmers. This effect is captured by a combination of linear and 
quadratic terms representing the education variable.  
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 The income variable was separated into two components: farm income and income from 
non-farm sources. This was done because the theoretical interpretation of the impact of non-farm 
income is not clear-cut. It can be argued that non-farm income provides a cushion against risk 
and, similarly to the effect of farm income, increases the probability of leaving the cooperative in 
favor of independent farming. On the other hand, it can also be argued that non-farm income 
derives in part from salaries paid by the cooperative and thus encourages the family to stay. If the 
second interpretation is true, then non-farm income should have a negative impact on the 
probability of leaving the cooperative. Because of this ambiguity, farm and non-farm income 
were included as separate explanatory variables in the logistic regression model. 
Table 4.  Individual choice between staying in a cooperative and becoming an independent farmer (logistic 
regression analysis) 
Explanatory variables Parameter 
estimate 
Significance 
level 
Expected impact on the probability of 
switching from cooperative to 
independent farming 
Intercept -3.621 0.042  
Human capital    
Age of head of household 0.151 0.037 
Age squared -0.001 0.068 
Negative when age is sufficiently high; 
positive for young people 
Education of head of household -0.104 0.332 
Education squared 0.009 0.425 
Positive for high educational endow-
ments; zero at low level of education 
Number of adults in household -0.024 0.693 Positive 
Physical capital    
Land 0.002 0.787 Positive 
Number of animals -0.041 0.008 Positive as a wealth factor; may be 
negative if pasture land is constrained 
Farm income 9.0E-6 0.058 Positive 
Non-farm income -20E-6 0.102 Positive (higher ability to take risk) or 
negative (less-dependent on farming) 
 
 The logistic regression results based on the survey data are presented in Table 4. The 
table compares the signs of the estimated coefficients with the expected signs from the 
hypotheses discussed above. Overall, the results do not fully support the viewpoints of the 
human and physical capital approaches. Among the human capital variables, the impact of age is 
consistent with the prior hypotheses: the linear term has a positive coefficient, while the 
quadratic term has a negative coefficient, and both coefficients are statistically significant (at 
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10%). The effect of education is not statistically significant, although the quadratic term has a 
positive sign as expected. The family labor pool does not have a significant effect on the decision 
to switch to individual farming. The results are less ambiguous for the physical capital variables. 
The coefficients of land and farm income have positive signs that are consistent with our prior 
hypotheses, but only the coefficient of farm income is statistically significant. The coefficient of 
non-farm income is negative with marginal statistical significance. Its impact is thus consistent 
with the second interpretation offered in our discussion of the hypotheses: higher non-farm 
income makes farming less relevant and therefore encourages the family to remain in the 
cooperative, where they receive lower farming income (see Table 1) but are exposed to less risk. 
The coefficient of the last physical capital variable – the number of animals – is negative and 
statistically significant. This is somewhat surprising, since one would expect people with more 
cattle to prefer independent farming. Yet, the availability of animals makes people less likely to 
leave the cooperative, despite their greater capital endowment. This can be explained by the fact 
that membership in the cooperative provides easy access to collective pastures at a relatively low 
cost. Buying cattle was indeed one of the main strategies for APC members to accumulate 
individual wealth, making use of free grazing rights at collective rangelands. 
 Our regression model is based on the underlying assumption that the decision to leave the 
cooperative in favor of independent farming is mainly determined by the human and physical 
capital endowments of the household. The results produced by the model suggest, however, that 
this decision is also influenced by other institutional factors that are not included explicitly in the 
model specification. The field survey provides some indications regarding the main motives for 
staying in the cooperative. Table 5 presents the frequency distribution of the reasons given by 
group III respondents (those who remain in a cooperative). Income earned in the cooperative is 
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given as the main reason by only 5% of the respondents and it is thus a marginal factor in the 
decision to stay. One third of the respondents attribute their decision to stay to the perceived 
advantages of cooperation and joint action: 12% indicate that they like working jointly with 
others and 21% see distinct advantages in the provision of cooperative services. Yet more than 
60% of the respondents explain their choice to remain in a cooperative by institutional and 
organizational constraints dating back to the creation of APCs under the Sandinista regime. Fully 
43% of respondents remain in a cooperative because of the uncertainty associated with the 
ownership of land that had been expropriated from the large estates and distributed to the 
population by the Sandinista government in the 1980s. Another 19% do not leave because of lack 
of legal arrangements for the resolution of the outstanding debt burden, which was accumulated 
as a result of the generous credit support available to the cooperatives during the Sandinista era.11  
Table 5. Reasons given by respondents for remaining in a cooperative 
Reasons Percent of group III respondents (N=167) 
Income in the cooperative 5 
Likes working jointly with others 12 
Access to cooperative services 21 
Uncertainties with land ownership 43 
Lack of mechanisms for resolution of cooperative debt 19 
 
While capital endowments may be important for peasants’ decisions, it seems from these 
qualitative questions that two institutional constraints – uncertainty associated with land 
ownership and difficulties with resolution of cooperative debt – play a dominant role in keeping 
Nicaraguan peasants in APCs. The respondents are sending a very clear signal that, until these 
two constraints are resolved, peasants are actually forced to remain in cooperatives. Those who 
choose to leave under the present circumstances ultimately may face the danger of losing their 
land when ownership rights are cleared and legalized or may find themselves faced with an 
insupportable obligation representing their share of cooperative debt.  
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Reasons to Stay: The Role of Social Capital 
Access to cooperative services and options for participating in joint activities are frequently 
mentioned in the literature as relevant reasons for remaining a member in a cooperative. Social 
capital clearly plays an important role as a mechanism for sharing risk with others and as a 
device for maintaining access to service provision. Access to services has become a particularly 
important consideration in Nicaragua, since state support to agriculture was substantially reduced 
after the collapse of the Sandinista government. Privatization of the rural banking system and 
decentralization of extension services (mostly without appropriate budgets) force peasant 
households to look for alternative institutional relations. Local networks with private agents 
(traders, moneylenders) and linkages with the voluntary sector (NGOs and externally financed 
rural development projects) are now of primary importance for the peasantry in guaranteeing 
access to credit, market outlets, inputs, and information.  
 To analyze the importance of social capital, we considered the role of cooperative 
relationships as a factor contributing to household expenditures or enabling access to rural 
financial markets. The survey database was used to determine whether peasants who are more 
involved in cooperative activities are actually better off in terms of welfare and borrowing 
options. We use a broad definition of cooperation, including participation in various types of 
social and institutional networks. Attention has therefore been given to community ties, various 
types of exchange relations (joint input provision and marketing), and group production and 
service delivery as indicators of the available social capital. Even when peasants decide to 
withdraw their land from the cooperative, they can still maintain some involvement in other 
networks with former members building on earlier cooperative experience. 
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 The empirical analysis addresses the significance of social capital for the welfare of 
peasant households. Attention is given to the direct contribution of social capital to the level of 
household expenditures and the indirect role of social capital as additional collateral for 
borrowing. We used OLS and Probit regressions to identify the impact of physical, human, and 
social capital on household expenditures and on access to credit, respectively.  
 Monthly expenditure is a reliable indicator of a household’s permanent income. All three 
groups of farmers were used in the expenditure regression, where the dependent variable 
included expenditures on food, clothes, education, transport, medicines, and electricity. Social 
capital, physical capital, and institutional networks are used as major explanatory variables for 
variations in expenditure, together with relevant individual and household characteristics (age, 
gender, education and family size).  
 For the Probit regression with access to credit as the dependent variable we constructed a 
random balanced subsample of farmers with and without access to financial services to guarantee 
normality. Access to credit is registered as the possibility of using financial services provided by 
formal institutions (banks) or semi-formal agencies (NGOs, moneylenders). Access may be less 
than actual use, since some peasants may prefer not to borrow, either due to risk aversion or 
because internal financial resources are available. About two-thirds of the peasants in our sample 
declared to have access to credit, whereas only 45% actually took loans. Most credit was 
provided by NGOs and development programs (35%), followed by banks (27%) and friends or 
relatives (16%). Households with access to credit attained expenditure levels that were on 
average about 20% higher than for households without access to credit. 
 Social and physical capitals were constructed as index variables by factor analysis,12 
which enabled us to include relationships between different aspects and find their common 
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underlying dimensions. For social capital, the following variables were used: the number of 
connections of the household with various institutions (e.g., farmers unions, traders, 
moneylenders, banks, village authorities), the level of participation in cooperative organizations, 
the number of activities coordinated with other peasants (e.g., shared input purchase, marketing, 
joint machinery services), and the percentage of crop output marketed jointly with others.  In a 
similar way, physical capital is calculated as an index variable that includes the number of capital 
goods (tools, tractors, implements, warehouses), the number of luxury goods (radio, television, 
motorbike, car), the number of large livestock (cows and horses), and the amount of land owned 
by the household (in manzanas).  
In addition, institutional linkages of households with market agents and the voluntary 
sector were included in the analysis (the state sector was ignored, since only 17 % of the sample 
still maintain connections with this sector). We used a dummy variable to indicate whether the 
household was primarily oriented towards market agencies (traders, moneylenders, shops) or 
voluntary sector organizations (NGOs and development projects). 
Table 6.  Impact of social capital on expenditures and access to credit 
Dependent variable: Expenditures (OLS regression) Access to credit (Probit) 
 
Explanatory variables: 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Significance level Parameter 
estimate 
Significance level
Constant 7.296 0.000 1.157 0.244 
Social capital (index) 0.239 0.000 0.699 0.000 
Physical capital (index) 0.180 0.000 -0.162 0.066 
Education (years) 0.066 0.000 0.018 0.594 
Household size (persons) 0.093 0.000 0.017 0.647 
Age (years) 0.035 0.017 -0.042 0.266 
Age squared -0.001 0.054 0.000 0.286 
Gender (0=male; 1= female) 0.069 0.527 0.720 0.471 
Distance to market (km) -0.002 0.510 0.027 0.023 
Sector (0= voluntary; 1=market)  -0.031 0.579 -0.545 0.006 
R2 0.38 0.21 
 
Social, physical, and human capitals have a positive and significant impact on household 
expenditures (Table 6, first two columns). Moreover, expenditures increase with age, but tend to 
decrease at higher ages, illustrating the nonlinear effect discussed before. The relation between 
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household size and expenditure is also positive, indicating that additional family members offer a 
positive contribution to household income. Social capital is particularly important for increasing 
the probability of access to credit for rural households, while physical capital surprisingly 
appears with a negative sign (see Table 6, last two columns). The latter result is surprising 
because one would expect that physical capital serves as collateral for borrowing. A possible 
explanation can be found in the highly insecure legal environment in Nicaragua, where 
registration of property rights is inadequate and many conflicting claims exist (Strasma 1998). 
As a result, the main components of physical property – land and buildings – are seldom used as 
collateral, since these assets cannot be sold in case of default. Therefore, social capital tends to 
be the preferred collateral, enabling group members to assume joint responsibility for the credit 
contract. 
Distance appears to have an unusual positive impact on access to credit. This could be 
explained by the fact that most farmers nowadays obtain credit though local NGOs and rural 
development projects. Donors generally prefer geographical targeting to poor people that are 
likely to be located in more remote and marginal regions. This is consistent with the fact that 
access to credit improves when a household maintains primarily relations with voluntary sector 
agencies. No indications were found for gender bias in credit provision. Most credit programs 
give a high weight to poverty targeting and the existence of local organizations, but tend to 
disregard the strong male dominance in traditional societies (Deere and Leon 2001). 
The social capital analysis reveals the positive effect of participation in social networks 
on household welfare and access to finance. The direct benefits of cooperative membership as a 
device for reducing transaction costs may be a reason for the slow transition towards independent 
farming. In addition, cooperative members also maintain some degree of coordination of 
 22
activities in order to capture the benefits of international cooperation projects and programs. The 
latter strategy is reinforced by the prevailing preference of foreign agencies to finance collective 
activities and the neglect of national agencies to provide substantial support for the development 
of independent farming in more remote areas. 
Concluding Remarks 
Production cooperatives have been established in Nicaragua during the Sandinista land reform 
process of the 1980s. Landless families were encouraged to join cooperatives rather than request 
a plot of land for individual farming. After about a decade, the socialist-oriented Sandinista 
regime was replaced in elections by a market-oriented government. Liberalization of the 
economy implied that former preferential treatment of agricultural cooperatives was abandoned. 
Whereas some of the cooperatives split up into individual farms, not all peasants abandoned 
cooperative membership.  
We analyzed differences in income position, resource use, and living standards between 
former cooperative members, peasants who continued their cooperative membership, and 
individual peasants who were already engaged in independent farming before the land reform. 
Rural families that leave the cooperative usually remain with limited land and capital resources. 
Peasants who stay in the cooperative do so because of major uncertainties regarding land 
ownership and outstanding debts. In addition, they benefit from better access to services and use 
their social capital to gain access to credit. Nicaraguan policies towards privatization of land 
ownership was ambiguous in the sense that no additional conditions have been created to enable 
farmers who decided to leave the cooperatives to overcome accumulation barriers. 
One of the main conclusions of this study is a reaffirmation of a fact that has been 
frequently observed in many developing and transition economies: access to land is the main 
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determinant of well being in rural communities. Giving rural people more land is the surest way 
of alleviating rural poverty, increasing incomes, and improving family welfare. It is therefore 
particularly important to eliminate the existing constraints to effective distribution of land to 
individuals in rural Nicaragua. People who leave the cooperative should be given their full and 
fair share of the land as a precondition for starting successful independent farming. The survey 
seems to indicate that former cooperative members are “short-changed” when they leave the 
cooperative: they get less than their fair share of land and assets and are thus handicapped from 
the outset in the new and risky endeavor of private farming. 
 To enable peasants to make a free choice between cooperative membership and 
individual farming, the government must deal with two institutional factors that have been 
clearly identified by the respondents as major obstacles to exit from cooperatives. First, it is 
essential to resolve the uncertainty regarding land ownership. APC members must be assured 
that the land they have been using for more than two decades will remain theirs regardless of the 
ownership antecedents. Where compensation is a relevant issue, former owners should be 
compensated by the state with money or monetary instruments, not through restitution. It is 
inconceivable from considerations of social justice that, after more than twenty years, the 
poverty-stricken peasants in Nicaragua should face the danger of losing their land – the main 
source of livelihood – through restitution to former estate owners.  
In the same vein, it is necessary to eliminate the uncertainty and opacity concerning the 
disposition of old debts accumulated by the cooperatives during the Sandinista period. The 
cooperative members cannot be held responsible for the creation of this debt: it was thrust upon 
them by government policies and it should now be lifted again by government decision. As in 
many other countries, writing off this old debt is probably the only socially just option if the 
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government wishes to enable the rural population to make their own choice between remaining 
cooperative members or starting up independent farming. 
 Finally, the Nicaraguan government and (inter)national organizations could contribute 
substantially to creating a more equitable environment for the peasantry through the provision of 
legal assistance for settling land conflicts and the delivery of rural financial services – including 
credit, savings, and insurance – for enabling farmers to improve their efficiency and to 
consolidate their landholdings. Especially in remote regions, where markets are less integrated 
and traditional patron–client relations still prevail, leaving the cooperative to take up individual 
farming involves severe institutional constraints. In this setting, there is undoubtedly room for 
further supportive measures aimed at reducing the transaction costs and the risks of independent 
farming. 
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NOTES 
                                                          
1 Field research for this paper was supported by the Netherlands–Israel Research Program (NIRP) grant 96-12.1. 
The project was carried out in collaboration with the School of Agricultural Economics (ESECA) at the National 
University of Nicaragua in Managua. Gustavo Siles, Orlando Cortes, Luis Rodriguez, Estela Aleman, Yani Jarquin, 
and Irena Guevara supervised the field work in Nicaragua. Support for data analysis was provided by Jos Vaessen, 
Danielle van Strien, Edoardo Masset (Wageningen University), Val Khutemliansky, Yulia Rabinovich, and Daria 
Zaslaver (The Hebrew University). 
2 Socialist agriculture included both collective and state farms, but it is collective farms (or cooperatives, as they 
were called in Central Eastern Europe) that dominated the rural space in the entire region. With the start of market 
reforms in the early 1990s, all state farms in the former Soviet Union were transformed into collective farms and 
their land and assets were privatized to the employees and the pensioners. In Central Eastern Europe, state farms 
were generally sold as going concern to outside investors or allowed to go bankrupt. Therefore, in our context, the 
relevant issue is the persistence of the large contingent of collective farms, which were quickly transformed after 
1990 into membership-based corporate structures in all transition countries. For details on differences between 
collective and state farms and their restructuring procedures see Lerman et al. (2004). 
3 Random sampling took place in four different agro-ecological zones defined according to major cropping systems. 
Data for the analysis were collected by a two-stage (village/farmer) sampling procedure. The sampling frame used 
for the random selection of villages and farmers was obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture and FENACOOP 
(National Cooperative Federation) listings. Fieldwork concentrated in the semi-arid León-Chinandega with 
traditional agro-export crops (cotton and sugar production), the semi-humid southern region comprising the Carazo 
mountains (coffee) and the Masaya-Granada plain area (horticulture crops and rice production), the mountainous 
interior area of Boaco and Chontales (livestock and cereal production), and the northern region of Matagalpa-Estelí 
(coffee production). In each of these four macro-regions, a random sample of 120 farm households (valid cases) was 
used, including equal proportions of members of agricultural production cooperatives, former members who are now 
engaged in independent farming, and small and medium-size independent peasants. 
4 We selected independent farmers with a farm size up to 40 manzanas (28 hectares) as a base for comparison, in 
line with the average plot size of cooperative members. 
5 This paper only analyzes the peasant’s decision to exit the cooperative and continue farming independently. The 
other alternative of leaving agriculture altogether and switching to a non-farming occupation (including migration to 
the city) is not included in this analysis. This alternative is analyzed by Barham and Childress (1992). Sale and 
breakdown of land reform cooperatives in Honduras is analyzed by Ruben and Funez (1993).  
6 State farms operated in Nicaragua until the mid-1980s but were strongly reduced at the end of that decade. The 
Sandinista government originally favoured state production, but had to abandon this policy after fierce peasant 
resistance. At the time of our survey, state farms represented less than 4% of land use (Strasma 1998). 
7 This also includes a small number of ‘traditional’ cooperatives created before the Sandinsta era. 
8 See for a concise overview of these issues: Deininger (1993).  
9 The low explanatory power of the model (R2 = 0.16, see Table 2) is due to large noise in the data and omitted 
variables in the model. 
10 The survey questions explicitly distinguished between farm assets owned by the cooperative farmer as an 
individual and by the cooperative as an organization. 
11 Credit to agriculture (as a share of agricultural GDP) declined from from 43 in the early 1990s to only 14% by the 
end of 2001 (World Bank 2003). 
12 Detailed results of the factor analysis can be obtained from the authors. 
